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tAbstract
While there is a common belief among policymakers and academics around the
world that Triple Helix relationships between university, industry and government
provide optimal conditions for innovation, it should be noted that the Triple Helix
concept has been developed from the experience of advanced economies in
the West. There is a lack of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence on
whether the Triple Helix model is applicable in non-Western contexts. Following the
understanding that the evolution of an ideal Triple Helix model is facilitated by
certain institutional logics in Western societies, this paper takes China as an example
to examine how the institutional logics in China are different from those of the West
and how the institutional logics in China would promote or impede the development
of the Triple Helix model in China in light of an extensive review of the relevant
literature and policy documents. The study suggests that to optimise the Chinese
innovation policies, China needs on the one hand to adjust some elements of its
institutional environment to facilitate the interactions between key innovation actors
and on the other hand to be innovative in developing its own Triple Helix modes
given the unique Chinese institutional environment which will persist in the
foreseeable future.
Keywords: Triple Helix; Innovation system; Institutionalism; Institutional logics, ChinaMultilingual abstracts
Please see Additional file 1 for translations of the abstract into the six official working
languages of the United Nations.Background
The model of Triple Helix interactions between university, industry and government
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997, 1995), alongside its variations such as the Quadruple
Helix (Carayannis and Campbell 2009) and Triple Helix twins (Etzkowitz and Zhou 2006),
has been commonly used as a normative framework among researchers for understanding
interactions between key actors in innovation systems. It has also become a common
strategy of many governments in developing innovation policies. One central claim of the
Triple Helix thesis is that the interrelations between academia, industry and government2014 Cai; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
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and Leydesdorff 2000).
In spite of the popularity of the Triple Helix model, it has not been without problems.
Among many other criticisms, one is that the Triple Helix model pays little attention to
national contexts (Balzat and Hanusch 2004; Shinn 2002) and other social settings (Cooke
2005). Therefore the Triple Helix model can hardly provide appropriate rationales on which
systematically structured criteria and indicators may be developed for researching,
measuring and comparing different empirical cases (Mowery and Sampat 2004), especially
when they are in different national and cultural contexts (Eun et al. 2006).
This implies that the Triple Helix model has not been fully developed to take into account
the context effect, which is defined as “the set of factors surrounding a phenomenon that
exert some direct or indirect influence on it” (Whetten 2009, p.31). It should be noted that
the formation of the Triple Helix model is a result of inductive theorising mainly in the
contexts of Western countries. The developers of the Triple Helix model, Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff, as well as their followers, do indeed acknowledge the differences between
Western and non-Western countries and even notice the variations among Western
societies. They have empirically examined Triple Helix models in different national contexts
in the special issues of some journals (See examples: Saad and Zawdie 2008; Leydesdorff
and Meyer 2003). Nevertheless, there is still a lack of united analytical frameworks to study
the Triple Helix development in different national contexts.
Instead of calling for alternative theories for non-Western contexts (Liu and Jiang 2001;
Williams and Woodson 2012; Eun et al. 2006; Zawislak and Dalmarco 2011; Bernasconi
2005), Cai (2013) attempted to enhance the context sensitivity of the Triple Helix by using
insights of institutional logics, following the understanding that an innovation system is not
only about complex functions and interactions among various organisational actors,
including government, enterprises, universities and research institutes, but also interplays
between these actors and institutions which may include, governmental policies and social
norms (Edquist 1997; Lundvall 1992; Kumaresan and Miyazaki 1999; Nelson 1993; OECD
1999). Cai’s (2013) paper identified the institutional logics in which the Triple Helix model
is grounded in Western societies and anticipated that these could be used as a basis to
develop a benchmarking framework for understanding to what extent the Triple Helix
model can be developed in other contexts, particularly non-Western ones. The author
argued that, on the one hand, the different, sometimes even contradictory, institutional
logics in a non-Western nation compared to the “ideal” in the West may cause barriers to
implementing the Triple Helix model, and, on the other hand, the competing logics may
also provide dynamics for social change as well as opportunities for innovation.
However, Cai’s (2013) framework has not so far been tested in any non-Western
contexts. This paper will fill the gap by taking China as an example and examine how the
institutional logics in China are different from those in the West, and whether the
institutional logics in China (would) facilitate or impede the development of the Triple Helix
model in China? The study is heavily based on review of the existing literature on the topic
but interpreted following the framework.
Regarding the implementation of the Triple Helix model in China, there have been a
number of studies since the Triple Helix concept was introduced into China for analysing
innovation systems by Zhou (2006) and Zhou and Peng (2008). These studies include, for
example, descriptions of Triple Helix relations between university, industry and government
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field (Zhang et al. 2013) or a specific region (Cai and Liu 2014), and some specific issues
within the Triple Helix framework, e.g. the technology transfer between university and
industry (Tang 2008; Rao 2013). These authors shared the view that the Triple Helix model
is indeed the solution for China, but to achieve the end the road is hard due mainly to some
unique characteristics of the Chinese context. However, few of them have tried to provide a
systematic evaluation of the implementation of the Triple Helix model in China and
especially offer theoretical accounts explaining related challenges and possible future
development. This paper not only presents the status quo of Triple Helix implementation
in China, but also, most importantly, contributes with an institutional logics perspective to
diagnosing the problems and potentials for China to adopt the Triple Helix model. It also
suggests that the differences between the institutional logics aligned with the originally
Western Triple Helix model and local institutional logics in China will become a source of
dynamics for innovation in China. As China is culturally and economically diverse, it is more
relevant to analyse the institutional logics and compare the differences at the regional level.Methods
The research methodology literature tends to indicate a correspondence between research
question and methodological design (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Newman and Benz
1998, p.24). This study is aimed to explore what are the institutional logics in China and
how these logics may affect the patterns of Triple Helix in China in comparison with the
logics aligned with the Triple Helix development in the West. As its main purpose is
primarily for “the articulation of many truths in meaningful social actions, stressing how
social experiences are created and given meanings” (Denzin and Lincoln 2003, p.13), thus a
qualitative approach is employed in this study where the empirical work is located in theory
or in an analytical framework (Thomas 1997, p. 87). The framework in this study is
developed by Cai (2013) and will be introduced in the next section. The empirical data in
this study include relevant literature, media reports and governmental reports, which are
used as sources of evidences for the exploration.Analytical framework
The Triple Helix model referred to in this paper mainly follows Etzkowitz’s (2008, 2002)
interpretation, who distinguishes between three types of Triple Helix models. A desired or
ideal model is overlapping triple helix relations between university, industry and
government, but develops from two opposing standpoints, namely the statist and laissez-
fair models. In the statist model, government controls both academia and industry, and is
expected to take the lead in developing projects and providing the resources for new
initiatives. Examples can be seen in the former Soviet Union, France and many Latin
American countries. In the laissez-faire model, industry, academia and government are
separate and independent from each other. These actors interact only modestly across
strong boundaries. This model is typically exemplified by the USA. A global tendency is a
move towards an overlapping or an ideal model, in which the three institutional spheres
overlap and collaborate with each other. The model represents a change “from one of
strong boundaries between separate institutional spheres and organisations to a more
flexible overlapping system, with each taking the role of the other” (Etzkowitz 2002, p.2).
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the perspective of dynamic evolution. Using the insights of institutional theory, he
distinguishes four development stages in the process of the institutionalisation of the Triple
Helix model. Institutionalisation is a process “by which social processes, obligations, or
actualities, come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and
Rowan 1977, p.341). Then the main activities for each stage are identified and aligned with
a variety of ideal institutional logics, drawing on the context of Western countries (Table 1).
Institutional logics can be generally understood as “the socially constructed, historical
pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space, and provide
meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, p.804). The institutional logics
prevailing within one country will have a marked effect on how the actors communicate
their interests, determine which problems are salient and which solutions are appropriate
(Thornton et al. 2012).
Cai (2013) also suggests that when conducting Triple Helix analyses in a non-Western
context, one must compare how the institutional logics there are similar/different to the
existing institutional logics aligned with the Triple Helix development in the West. This is
important for analysing how specific non-Western institutional logics may facilitate or
constrain Triple Helix activities. In the next section, the institutional logics in China will be
examined and compared to those of the West following the aforementioned framework.
Before that, two points are worth noting.
First, the development of Triple Helix is a relatively long process. In many Western
countries, it dates back to the 1980s and the 1990s. When looking at the development of
Chinese innovation systems, scholars often trace back to the end of 1970s, when China
initiated economic reforms together with the open-door policy (Wang and Zhou 2008; XueTable 1 Institutional orders in the evolution of Triple Helix model
Stages of
development
Major Triple Helix activities Favourable institutional logics
Stage 1 Realising the importance of entering a
reciprocal relationship between university,
industry and government
● Shared beliefs on knowledge as a key
to economic growth (Logics of




Stage 2 Taking the role of the other ● Market oriented organisational cultures
(Logics of market at the state level)
intra-organisational
transformation ● Process oriented management culture
in technology innovation (Logics of
knowledge management in the fields
of industry and academia)
Stage 3 Growing and innovating through
cooperation with others
● Effective protection for intellectual
property rights and market participants
(Logics of intellectual property at the




● Civil society (Logics of civil society at
the state level)
Stage 4 Feedback loops between policy-makers
and participants
● Competitive market environment
(logics of competition in the field of
university)
Institutionalisation of
the Triple Helix model
Institutionalised norms of “entrepreneurial
university”, “knowledge-based formation
and growth”, and “innovation state”
(Etzkowitz 2008).
● Democratic policymaking process
(Logics of democracy in the field of
government)
Source: Cai (2013).
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China will cover the time span of the past 35 years, although the launch of an explicit policy
towards the Triple Helix model was very recent, mainly reflected in the National Medium-
and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020) by the
State Council (2006).
Second, knowledge production organisations in China are composed of both universities
and research institutes. From the 1950s to the 1970s, research institutes used to be the only
sector for research, while universities’ missions were primarily teaching. Being strongly
influenced by the Soviet Union, the socialist government established a complex research
institute system, the most important one being the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Meanwhile, higher education institutions and faculties were regrouped and aligned
according to areas of specialisation. Since the 1980s, higher education reforms have adopted
a model from the United States which emphasises the development of comprehensive and
research universities. Thus the Chinese innovation system is referred to as a network
consisting of actors like universities, research institutes, government agencies and
enterprises. With respect to the Triple Helix model, both universities and research institutes
(URIs) represent the spiral of knowledge production organisations.Results and Discussion
Stage I: Realisation of the needs
Triple Helix activities and aligned institutional logics in the West
In the first stage, as suggested by Etzkowitz (2008, p.8), “a Triple Helix regime typically
begins as university, industry, and government enter into a reciprocal relationship with each
other in which each attempts to enhance the performance of the other”. It has been
commonly acknowledged that single organisational sectors alone can no longer respond to
changes and uncertainties unless they cooperate with each other. In this stage, the
collaboration between university, industry and government for enhancing the local
economy is mainly through their traditional roles. For example, universities produce and
transfer more knowledge to industry and society, while gaining additional funding sources
from industry and government to strengthen the performance of research. The institutional
logic aligned with the first stage activities is the social belief shared by government and
industry that knowledge production and technology advancement are the key to economic
growth and success in economic competition. While government and industry are
motivated by the belief, the university’s involvement in technology transfer in the initial
stage is mainly driven by public policies and financial incentives.
Due to such belief, although many Western universities have suffered governmental
budget cuts since the 1980s, the actual public funding spent on higher education has
not declined but is being directed through more diversified channels. For instance,
some public funding has been used to provide incentives and to promote university
and industry cooperation for knowledge generation and knowledge transfer.
Nowadays, one common governmental strategy is to concentrate funding on support-
ing research and development (R&D) in fast-growing or high-potential areas with the
expectation that the investment will eventually pay off though economic growth led by
the companies that benefit from cutting edge knowledge. For their survival or sustain-
able development, firms firmly believe, too, that innovation is the key (Cefis and
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their R&D.
The logic concerning beliefs on knowledge as a key to economic growth and its impact on the
Triple Helix development in China
Since the Chinese economic reform started in the 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the former national
leader, had repeatedly stressed that progress in science, technology and education was
fundamental to economic development and modernisation. When Jiang Zemin came to
power in 1992, he addressed in the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party
claiming that the emphasis of the economic construction should be placed on the track of
depending on science and technology progress and people’s improved culture and
knowledge. In 1995, the strategy of “Invigorating the Country through Science and
Education” was announced by the Chinese government (The Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party and The State Council of China 1995) and since then it has been
set as a basic State policy. The State has also earmarked funding for this strategy ever since
it was included in the five-year plan for 1996–2000 (The State Council of China 1996). In
spite of such a strategy endorsed by the central government, only in recent years did a
shared belief develop among local governments and firms that technology advancement
and innovation are the key to economic growth.
In the first 30 years of the economic reforms in China, local governments’ main concern
was how to maintain high GDP growth but by other means than taking effective measures
to ensure technology advancement. This is to a large extent caused by the “local officials’”
promotion tournament, which was considered by Zhou (2007) as a model to explain the
incentives for China’s economic growth in the three decades since 1978. The promotion
tournament was one kind of administrative governance model. It was designed by the upper
level government to select the chief officials of the lower level based on competition, where
the GDP growth rate was a key factor, along with others such as foreign direct investment,
employment rate and social stability (World Bank and Development Research Centre of the
State Council of China 2013). During the period from 1992 to 2000, the local governments
found that the most effective way to maintain GDP growth was to control the land (Cao
2010): by acquiring rural land at lower prices and selling at higher prices in the market for
urban use. They could easily shed their burden of the cost to promote economic growth
and to strengthen their position in regional competition. “Supposing local governments
have monopolistic control over the bulk of local resources, which is the case in China, and
that they profit simply by selling off land. What incentive do these local governments have
to develop an environment that fosters innovation and a knowledge based economy?”
(Guo 2010). The competition did ensure the economic growth at a fast speed for
30 years, but at the cost of over-exploitation of natural resources and environmental
degradation (OECD 2007).
Chinese industry is still dominated by manufacturing. Many of manufacturing companies’
main concern for growth used to be in reducing production costs instead of seeking for
value added products through technology advancement. Some studies in the late 1990s
reported that Chinese firms were either reluctant to or less capable of technology
innovation (Suttmeier 1997; Gu 1998). It was reported by the OECD (2007) that by
the mid-2000s the positive contribution to the manufacturing trade balance came
overwhelmingly from low-technology exports. Meanwhile, the high technology industries
Cai Triple Helix 2014, 1:1 Page 7 of 20
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40604-014-0001-2were primarily under foreign control. The lesser demands from domestic firms for
innovation also impeded Chinese universities’ incentives to commercialise their knowledge
and technology.
However, the situation is changing. While China has maintained very rapid economic
growth over the past three decades, the low-wage and labour-intensive manufacturing as a
main driver of economic growth has been challenged by emerging competitors in South
East Asia as well as by China’s domestic environmental degradation. To ensure sustainable
development in the future, China has recently shifted its economic priority from labour-
intensive production to capital-intensive and technology intensive production (The State
Council of China 2006). In the new waves of reforms, the GDP growth is no longer a key
factor in the promotion of local government leaders. Rather, local governments must be
accountable for economic and environmental sustainability (Organization Department of
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 2013). Since the export oriented
manufacturing industry was seriously hit by the 2008 financial crisis, the pursuit of
technology innovation has not only been the cry of the central government but also become
important for enterprises and local government (Chen 2008; Wang and Li 2013). China is
striving to find its own way to transform its economy by focusing on indigenous R&D, in
contrast to the previous approach of relying on imported technology and equipment (Guan
et al. 2009).
The rising awareness of technology and knowledge innovation as a key for sustainable
economic growth may enable the “Triple Helix impetus” as labelled by Etzkowitz (2008),
meaning that university, industry, and government realise the need to develop a reciprocal
relationship. Although such a belief has just started to grow and it will take more time until
it is deeply rooted in society, China is turning to gain a stronger normative basis for
developing the Triple Helix. To strengthen the motivations of both URIs and enterprises to
cooperate with each other, the Chinese government has also provided financial incentives
and regulatory mandates. Both the normative and regulative drivers lead to the second and
the third stages of Triple Helix evolution.Stage 2: intra-organisational transformation
Triple Helix activities and aligned institutional logics in the West
In the second step, internal transformation is characterised by “taking the role of the other”
(Etzkowitz 2008, p.9). This means that, in addition to performing its traditional tasks (as
primary activities), each takes the role of the other (as secondary activities), but meanwhile
university, industry or government respectively maintain their primary roles and distinct
identities. In this stage universities engage directly in business activities, such as selling
education and research services; companies further strengthen the R&D activities and even
establish corporate universities to develop the skills of their professionals and managers;
government also provides venture capital to help start new enterprises to promote potential
economic growth. The supporting institutional logics for these activities are the cultures of
1) market orientation and 2) process management.
Taking the role of the other can be perceived as both organisations learning from each
other and a way of organisational innovation. One of the main drivers for organisational
learning and innovation is market orientation (Hurley and Hult 1998), which is defined as
“the organisation culture that most effectively and efficiently creates the necessary
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performance for the business” (Narver and Slater 1990, p.21). Adopting a market
orientation approach in an organisation is about how the organisation is oriented to the
market, paying more attention to consumers’ needs, competitors’ advantages, and inter-
functional coordination (Narver and Slater 1990). Market oriented culture has been
considered to be a key to enhance competitive advantages for organisations to best pursue
interest and profit (Liao et al. 2011).
One competitive advantage that organisations are striving for is knowledge or technology
innovation. “The innovation process is highly dependent on the knowledge accumulation
and learning processes in the organisation” (Lopperi and Soininen 2005, p.4). To ensure
knowledge accumulation and learning from existing knowledge, it is important to apply
“process management” which “involves adherence to routines through the adoption of
standardised best practices throughout an organisation” and “ensures that organisational
processes are repeated, allowing for continued efficiency improvements” (Benner and
Tushman 2002, p.678). In this light, innovation is more incremental and exploitative in
nature rather than explorative. As distinguished by Benner and Tushman (2002),
exploitative innovation builds on an existing technology trajectory, while explorative
innovation involves a shift to a different technological trajectory. They further note that
“organisations will innovate more rapidly as they incrementally improve innovation
processes, yet the variance in the resulting innovation and/or new product development
outcomes will be reduced” (Ibid., p. 680).
Lang (2009), a Hong Kong-based economist, observed that the success of technology
innovation in the West is largely attributed to the culture of process management. The
ethos of process management can also be reflected in research activities in the West. In a
Western conception, research is basically about knowledge accumulation and transmission
through the “trial and error” method and by following a rigid academic protocol (Lang
2009). It follows that new knowledge is always generated from existing knowledge and the
process of knowledge generation is well-documented. Following the logic of process
management, organisations’ competitive advantages when “taking the role of the other” are
based on their existing know-how. Thus the Triple Helix model enables knowledge and
technology organisations to contribute to innovation through incorporating existing
knowledge/technology (Marques et al. 2006).
The logic of market orientation and its impact on the Triple Helix development in China
Although China has introduced market mechanisms since the end of 1970s, more profound
development in market economy only commenced after Xiaoping’s call for accelerating
economic reform and opening up of the economy to the outside world during his publicised
tour to southern provinces in early 1992. Since then, organisations in both industry and
university sectors have tended to be more market oriented. For instance, Liu et al. (2003)
first comprehensively investigated to what extent Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs)
were market oriented and how this was related to the performance of the enterprises. The
study found: 1) SOEs were relatively market oriented; 2) the higher market-oriented
organisations tended to be more learning-oriented, reported more entrepreneurship in
organisations, and achieved a higher level of organisational performance. It was also
reported that the level of market orientation was high in companies in economically
developed regions in China (Kaynak and Kara 2004). However, another empirical study on
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of the sample firms could be considered to be truly market oriented by Western standards
(Bathgate et al. 2006). The studies indicate an imbalanced development of market
orientation.
It was argued by Qu and Ennew (2005) that it was the heritage of the socialist regime
such as the stringent government regulations, ownership structure, and resource availability
that greatly impeded market orientation in China. Indeed, China is in the process of
transformation to a market economy, and the market system is still incomplete in many
aspects, including a mix of market and non-market measures that shapes incentives for
producers and consumers, a lack of clarity in distinguishing the individual roles of
government, state enterprises and the private sector (World Bank and Development
Research Centre of the State Council of China 2013) as well as the governmental
“orientation towards control over resources” (Cao 2010, p.3). While acknowledging the
relatively poor market orientation in the business sector, a bigger gap can be assumed
among universities and research institutes in spite of a scarcity of research on the topic.
While China is continuously making its economy more market oriented, the logic of market
will be foreseeably more embedded in the organisational culture of both URIs and
enterprises.
The logic of process management and its impact on the Triple Helix development in China
Regarding the culture of technology and innovation management, the Chinese practices are
more goal oriented rather than process oriented due to the country’s inherent
cultural constraints (Lang 2009). Ignoring process management is associated with the
Chinese mentality of being pragmatic. In other words, the Chinese are inclined to find
short-cuts to outcomes (Lang 2009). Thus sometimes the Chinese prefer pragmatic half
solutions over finding the root cause of failures, and technology companies are keen to
reverse engineering as this is an easy way to get rich (Someren and Someren-Wang 2013).
In his study Lang he found that only 15% of Chinese enterprises believed that process
management was the key to sustaining competitive advantage. The primary objective in the
management of Chinese enterprises is to achieve their goals (Lang 2009), without
paying much attraction to documenting “routines that underlie the delivery of an
organisation’s product or service across the organisation” (Benner and Tushman 2002,
p.678). In this manner, the foundation of technology innovation, namely knowledge
accumulation and knowledge transmission, is ignored. As some empirical studies
demonstrated goal oriented management has a negative relationship with innovation
(Harms et al. 2010).
A similar problem can be seen in individual academics’ management of their own
knowledge production, e.g. research and academic paper writing. Traditionally, there are
few rules about citation and attribution in Chinese academic writing (Zhang 2011).
Sometimes, it is difficult to figure out what are the authors’ own ideas/contributions and
what is existing knowledge due to inappropriate citing in Chinese academic publications.
Nevertheless, a western standard of judging the quality of academic papers has gradually
gained legitimacy in the Chinese academic community.
The process management in knowledge production and technology innovation is very
important for both efficiency and innovation in the processes (Benner and Tushman 2002).
Thus some problems like low R&D intensity and poor R&D capability in China (Wang and
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enterprises.
Both the logics of market orientation and process management sustain one of the key
features of the Triple Helix— “taking the role of the other”, meaning that while engaging in
the activities of the other field, one must maintain its core missions. As stressed by
Etzkowitz (2006), while universities take the role of industry, they must adapt the business
functions in ways that are compatible with their primary missions, namely research and
training. He further warned:
The danger of the university mining its innovation store and failing to replenish it because
of dependence on short-term commercial gains. The entrepreneurial university is not the
industrialised university, a “job shop” subordinated to local firms. Rather, it is a research
university that translates its research findings into use through a variety of mechanisms
such as liaison offices, contracts with firms, patenting, licensing, and so on, giving the
university some aspects of a business, while retaining its previous classical functions.
(Ibid, p.319)
In China, some research institutes and even universities may run into the danger
described by Etzkowitz. These organisations do not just engage with industry but actually
become part of it. Many technology-oriented research institutes have been transformed into
enterprises since 1999, when the government tended to stimulate these institutes’ awareness
to compete in the market. Universities are likewise keen to set up their own businesses,
mainly through establishing university-owned enterprises (UREs). However, merely
changing a public organisation into a commercial entity does not necessarily make the
organisation more market oriented. As many URIs become businesses, “this has led to the
ineffectiveness of the so-called synergic innovation” (Wang and Li 2013, p.33).Stage 3: Interactions between organisations in the three sectors
Triple Helix activities and aligned institutional logics in the West
During the process on “taking the role of the other”, organisational actors in the three
sectors have respectively realised that engaging in others’ fields is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for achieving the desired goals. In addition, the intra-organisational
transformation also causes new challenges and demands within and across sectors. As a
solution, they need even closer cooperation and interaction with each other (Etzkowitz
2008). Thus, the third step in the development of the Triple Helix is the evolution
of trilateral interactions between the three sectors, characterised by increasing
interdependency between the three spirals: One spiral has a significant influence on the
other’s actions, and through the interactions, organisations in each spiral are able to find
new ideas from the others to solve problems and meet new needs. For instance, a
university’s knowledge production cannot be carried out by itself, but needs industry not
only as a source of research problems but also as a strong partner in knowledge production.
Meanwhile, university technology transfer is dependent on the conditions or environments
created by the government. “The firm is thus transformed from a competitive unit related
to other firms solely through the market to a Triple Helix entity increasingly based on
relationships with other firms as well as academia and government” (Etzkowitz 2008, p.58).
The interactions also result in the creation of hybrid organisations, such as incubators, joint
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logics in Western society are 1) legal protection of intellectual property (IP) and 2) civil
society.
The most crucial development in Triple Helix inter-organisational relations is the
cooperation and interaction between university and industry, founded on trust between the
two parties. The trust is guaranteed by a mature institutional context for IP protection. For
instance, the technology transfer between university and industry in the USA has only
developed at a fast pace since the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act. As required by law, universities are
able to retain ownership of inventions made on federally funded research. Thus a firm that
engages in productising an invention patented by a university can hold an exclusive license
once this is granted by the university.
According to Etzkowitz (2008), effective interaction between the three spirals is also
subject to broad social participation, including both top-down and bottom-up initiatives. As
such, the Triple Helix model can be best developed in a civil society, which allows free
mobilisation and organisation, debate and initiatives, and hence encourages diverse sources
of innovation. He further implies that successful Triple Helix operation is not coordinated
entirely by the state, but also depends on the commitment at the local level as well as the
inputs of a variety of innovation actors. It has also been argued elsewhere that as policies
related to innovation systems are often confronted with issues that are both complex and
controversial, one attempt to deal with such a complex problem is thus via citizen
involvement (Griessler 2012).
Etzkowitz’s position is consistent with the ideas of Quadruple Helix (Carayannis and
Campbell 2009) in which society or the public is added as the fourth helix, but Leydesdorff
and Etzkowitz (2003) do not consider the necessity of transforming the Triple Helix to
Quadruple Helix by arguing that civil society or the public is the institutional foundation in
which the Triple Helix has evolved. Although civil society is characterised by its alleged
independence from the state (Perry and Fuller 1991), it cannot live without the state.
Neither can it exist without reference to a market dominated by private actors. Rather, it
serves as a buffer zone between the control of authorities and private initiatives (Seppälä
1992) and thus facilitates both top-down governance and grassroots initiatives to best
interact and engage with each other in innovation processes (Carayannis and Campbell
2012).
The logic of IP protection and its impact in the Triple Helix development in China
China introduced IP legislation as early as 1950, and the Chinese IP laws have been
developed more in line with international standards since the 1980s. Meanwhile, there has
been a growing awareness that IP protection is a precondition for both China’s domestic
technology development and its access to advanced technologies from the developed
countries. However, the problem in China is the inadequate reinforcement of the IP laws
(Wang 2004). This results in a lack of trust between knowledge production and knowledge
application organisations for developing effective and reciprocal cooperation relationships
(Wang 2011). Therefore, universities feel it is safe and easy to commercialise the technology
in their own circle (Xue and Zhou 2011). For this reason, particularly in the 1990s and early
2000s, universities primarily transformed their research outputs into market products
through university-owned enterprises (UREs) rather than going through a long and
complicated negotiating process with other enterprises (Eun et al. 2006). In Western
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organisations and venture investors. Chinese UREs try to perform all three roles at once,
integrating several stages of the research, development and commercialisation process into
one organisational entity (Kroll and Liefner 2008).
While all these problems are undeniable, IP protection in China has recently improved at
a faster pace than ever, as evidenced by the surge in the number of China’s patents (Hu and
Jefferson 2009), the growth of foreign direct investment (Awokuse and Yin 2010b) and
imports of technology-intensive products (Awokuse and Yin 2010a). Also, URE has declined
recently, and has been replaced by other forms of university-industry links, such as
collaborative research between universities and firms, education and training, information
exchange between universities and firms, academic research, transferring proprietary
technology (patent licensing), university science parks and spin-off companies (Eun 2009).
In addition, many Western companies have learnt how to protect their R&D operations by
themselves in the Chinese environment (Zhao 2006; Keupp et al. 2009).
The logic of civil society and its impact on the Triple Helix development in China
Civil society is a Western concept. When it comes to how civil society has developed in
China there are mixed views and contradictory evidence, but it can be generally concluded
that a civil society is emerging but slowly and in a different way from that in the West
(Chamberlain 1993). What is relevant for understanding the Triple Helix development is
that there are no functional mechanisms that could mediate between top-down control and
bottom-up initiatives. For instance, in their study, Wu and Gong (2012) reported how a
bottom-up innovation was blocked by the top-town control of local authorities. The authors
called for China to adopt a “co-production approach” as commonly used in European
countries, which sees ordinary people as resources and contributors in social and economic
development, rather than as passive service recipients.
So far Chinese economic reforms and well as the development of national innovation
systems have come from top-down initiatives. To encourage university and industry
cooperation, the central government has invested heavily in national science parks and
national R&D programmes. In a situation where there is less trust between academia and
industry sectors, such an approach is practically useful especial for national priority projects.
Yet, “it can also waste resources to generate prestige-driven flops” (Someren and Someren-
Wang 2013, p.31) and “may fail to ensure adequate resources for emerging technologies”
(WIPO 2007, p.15).
The Chinese government does realise the need to stimulate bottom-up initiatives,
but lacks of effective policy measures. Due to the absence of civil society logics and
effective mechanism to coordinate between top-down and bottom-up initiatives, the
development paths for bottom-up initiatives may be diversified and unpredictable,
depending on the decisions of some key bureaucrats and particular local conditions. For
instance, Cai and Liu (2014) identify a new path of Triple Helix development in the case
study of the Tongi Creative Centre, labelled the “delayed government-led mode”,
representing a different pattern than any of the three models described in the classic
Triple Helix literature (Etzkowitz 2002; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) or particularly
the statist model deemed by Etzkowitz et al. (2007a) as the case in China.
In the initial stage, the interactions between Tongji University and the surrounding
industry (mainly the university’s spin-off companies) in the cluster were spontaneous and
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companies grew very fast, it gradually got special attention from the Yangpu district
government where the Tongji University was located. Then the cluster entered into the
second development stage, in which the relations between university, industry and (district)
government closely resemble the “ideal” Triple Helix mode. Here, the district government
came into the picture as a partner, performing its role through “reflective control”
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). The local government poured financial resources to
promote the cluster’s development and also matched supportive policies. In the last stage,
the Shanghai municipal government and the central government got involved and took
control of the overall development of the cluster. Especially, the central government played
an important role in integrating the university into the national innovation system, e.g. in
building cross-regional linkages among the university, industry and local government and in
maximising the intangible capital of the cluster through a number of influential
programmes. Although the district government is still there, its role is on the one hand
outweighed by the municipal and central governments and on the other hand has been
transformed to be more encompassing. Such process is illustrated in Figure 1.Stage 4: Institutionalisation of the Triple Helix model
Triple Helix activities and aligned institutional logics in the West
The final stage is the institutionalisation of the Triple Helix, meaning that the concept
together with its associated activities has become a set of routines or practices that are being
reproduced over time and tend to serve as a cognitive framework structuring the actions of
key actors, such as academia, industry and government. To facilitate the institutionalisation
process, two institutional logics are important, namely 1) the market competition
environment and 2) democracy in policymaking. Both are important in the process of
collective sense-making and belief shaping.
The institutionalisation of the Triple Helix may take many rounds of revisions and
adjustments based on feedback of the participants. The importance of feedback loops in the
evolution of the Triple Helix has been pointed out by Viale and Pozzali (2010): When a
government tries to promote university and industry cooperation by introducing financial
incentives for relevant participants, the effect is determined by either positive or negative
feedback generated by the incentives’ impact on relevant actors’ behaviour; While negative












Figure 1 Delayed government-led model. Source: Cai and Liu (2014).
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develop in competitive market systems, where feedback mechanisms are well developed.
To effectively establish the feedback from participants in the policy-making process also
requires a political system in which social groups and individuals who are involved in and
affected by a policy programme have a chance to influence the policymaking. As noted by
Carayannis and Campbell (2012, p.3): “democracy shapes and drives government, academic,
and industrial policies and practices and where a proper calibration of the issues addressed
and the frequency modulation of the feedback received via [a democratic action] allows for
higher order learning to impart intelligence and enact wisdom in choices and initiatives”.
The logic of market competition and its impact on the Triple Helix development in China
In China there is severe market competition, but competition mechanisms are not well
developed. The market competition in China can be seen from two perspectives. First, there
is a strong cross-regional competition originally driven by China’s transition to capitalism
(Li et al. 2000), illustrated by the “local official promotion tournament” as mentioned early
in Section “The logic of market competition and its impact on the Triple Helix development
in China”. Second, there is unfair market competition between SOEs and private firms.
This is because the SOEs have privileged access to business opportunities and key
resources to exploit the opportunities. As documented in the report by the World Bank
and Development Research Centre of the State Council of China (2013), SOEs have a
close connection with the Chinese government by which the Chinese economy is
controlled, occupy pillar industries where the entry threshold for private firms is
extremely high in practice, and enjoy preferential access to finance and other important
inputs. Hopefully such situations are going to change. In the Resolution concerning Some
Major Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform issued by the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party (2013), a key message is to strengthen the role of market in
allocating resources to intensify economic structural reform, e.g. by putting private firms
on an equal basis to compete with SOEs in the marketplace.
While the further changes remain to be seen, currently it has been commonly
acknowledged that market competition insufficiency has limited the innovation capability of
Chinese enterprises (World Bank and Development Research Centre of the State Council of
China 2013; Wang and Li 2013). Either being too easy or too hard to gain the necessary
resources would demotivate the enterprises to engage with innovation. More importantly,
due to the lack of mature market competition mechanisms, it is unlikely to develop healthy
feedback loops for institutionalising the Triple Helix model.
The logic of democracy in policymaking and its impact on the Triple Helix development
Neither are the feedback loops supported by the policymaking system in China. The nature
of the policymaking process in China differs from case to case. As Yuan Zhenguo pointed
out, “in terms of educational policy-making process, there is no obvious model and given
procedure to go by” (Yuan 2000, p.174). Some policies are based on policymakers’
occasional discoveries or subjective decisions; other policies are determined by irrational
factors such as policy makers’ interests or even personalities (Yuan 1996). However, China
is now trying to change its political system, though the pace is slow. Some progress can be
seen in the process of preparing the Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform
and Development (2010–2020), where there was a dramatic increase in the use of social
participation in the document drafting processes. Not only were hundreds of experts
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2011). Nevertheless, there is no institutional guarantee of democracy in policymaking.
Many studies on Chinese innovation systems (Wang and Li 2013; Wang and Zhou 2008;
Liu and White 2001), Triple Helix (Xue and Zhou 2011; Zhang et al. 2013; Zhou and Peng
2008) and university and industry linkages (Chen 2012; Liu and Jiang 2001; Eun et al. 2006)
have pointed out a number of challenges in China and also provided policy recommenda-
tions. Although these studies have been published in a time span of more than a decade,
the challenges and suggestions identified there are very similar. The major challenges
include low degree of technology transfer between university and industry, weak IP protec-
tion, insufficient competition coordination for innovation, etc. The policy recommendations
are all about measures to solve these problems and improve the institutional environment
for innovation. This situation shows a problem in the policymaking process: feedback can
hardly be assimilated by policymakers.Conclusions
The Triple Helix model not only serves as a framework for understanding relationships and
interactions between key actors in Chinese innovation systems, but has also become salient
in Chinese national industrial and science and technology policies. However, what remains
unknown in the existing studies is how well the Triple Helix relationships have been
developed and what affects the development of the Triple Helix interactions (Wang et al.
2013). To better understand these issues, this study identified some key institutional logics
in the Chinese context and discussed their impact on the development of Triple Helix in
China.
The study indicates that although Chinese economic reforms have changed the policy
environment in a direction that may facilitate the implementation of the Triple Helix model
in China, some institutional logics at work may shape its development in a different way as
seen in the West. The institutional logics that are gradually coming closer to those of the
West include: 1) beliefs in technology innovation as a key to economic growth, 2) market
orientation, 3) IPR protection, and 4) market competition. The other three institutional
logics, namely 1) process management, 2) civil society, and 3) democracy in policymaking,
aligned with the Triple Helix activities in the West are largely absent in China. The counter-
parts of these logics in China are deeply rooted in the Chinese traditions and political
system, and are likely to persist in the foreseeable future.
The contribution of this study to the literature on the Triple Helix, particularly in the
context of China, is three-fold. First, the study has primarily proved the relevance of an
analytical framework developed by Cai (2013) on the context-effect of Triple Helix on non-
Western countries. It shows that the seven dimensions for understanding the institutional
logics aligned with Triple Helix activities in Western countries serve a relevant tool for
understanding the institutional logics in China. As the study is strictly guided by the
framework, however, whether there are other institutional logics that are beyond the seven
dimensions, but affect the Triple Helix development in China, remains for future research
to find out.
Second, with the understanding of institutional logics in China based on the study, one
may better explain the reasons behind the problems in the development of Chinese
innovation systems. A number of scholars (Wang and Li 2013; Liu and Jiang 2001; Liu and
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environment, but none of them has detailed what the Chinese context is. This study is a
pioneer in decomposing the abstract concept of Chinese context into a set of institutional
logics with respect to Triple Helix development. This offers the opportunity to make a more
accurate diagnosis of what institutional elements of the Chinese context cause what
problems. Thus, more pertinent policy recommendations can be expected. This will
necessitate further in-depth analyses. Although this study addresses a number of “common”
institutional logics in China, the situations may differ from one region to another. Therefore
more detailed analysis must focus on regional levels.
Third, the institutional logics perspective and especially the mapping of institutional logics
in China may provide a normative framework for designing Chinese innovation policies, e.g.
its own Triple Helix models. To this end, a variety of models of interaction between
university, industry and government at both national and regional levels needs to be
examined. The empirical information gathered from these practices will be used to make
two kinds of analysis: what institutional logics impede the implementation of the Triple
Helix model in China? And what models of university-industry-government interactions
best suit China’s institutional environment.
The investigation of the first question is mainly to achieve a better understanding of how
to plan institutional changes. Developing an innovation system is not merely about how to
manipulate the relations of academia, industry and government for technology innovation,
but is also a matter of adjusting the institutional environment or institutional innovation.
Therefore, to successfully construct China as an innovative country it is about how China
can manage institutional changes. Designing and making institutional changes is very
complex and complicated. Among many other things, the starting point is to know what
needs to change and how possibly to achieve this. In this regard, few studies and discussions
exist in China. This study is indeed an attempt in that direction, but is rather preliminary.
The study of the second question might be more relevant to Chinese innovation policy-
making. Given that some institutional logics are unlikely to undergo significant change in
the near future, it is more relevant to think how to be effective within the current institu-
tional constraints. As claimed by Friedland and Alford (1991), the contradictions inherent
in the differentiated set of institutional logics provide individuals, groups and organisations
with cultural resources for change. In this light, Liu and White (2001) further argued that
when China develops its national innovation system, the differences in the initial conditions
between China and the West are not the barriers to change but rather a basis on which to
create a new system. In other words, China should try to be innovative in developing its
own Triple Helix models, instead of simply adopting the one that has proven successful in
the West. Actually, the experience of Tongji Creative Cluster in Shanghai has already
demonstrated successful models, for instance the one, called “delayed government-led
model” proposed by Cai and Liu (2014), but it would be useful to analyse more cases with
institutional logics thinking in mind. Nevertheless, some ideas concerning an indigenous
Chinese Triple Helix model can be speculated.
Given the Chinese context, particularly the political system, it is inevitable that the State
has a central role in the innovation processes. Especially for profound industrial projects, it
would be difficult to achieve the desired goals without the central control and coordination
of the state. In spite of such fact, a statist model is not necessarily the only option, though it
is more or less the case in the national innovation system in China. As China is huge and
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systems in China (Chen and Guan 2011). The specific Triple Helix models for innovation
may differ across regions, depending on local economic development conditions. Among
those, the most successful ones must properly handle two issues: one is about the IP
protection when it comes to the technology transfer from academia to industry and the
other is about how to promote bottom-up initiatives. While China is still striving for
building up effective IP protection system, in the current situation the companies that more
effectively participated in Triple Helix interactions are the university spin-off enterprises
and the firms in science parks. In a situation where there is less trust between academia and
industry due to the weak protection of intellectual rights in China, establishing national
science parks coordinated by the State is practically useful, especially for national priority
projects.
It has been criticised that the main problem in China’s innovation system development is
the lack of functional mechanism mediating between top-down and bottom-up initiatives
(Gu and Lundvall 2006; Etzkowitz et al. 2007b; Etzkowitz 2008). The Chinese government
does realise the need to stimulate bottom-up initiatives, but lacks effective policy measures.
In the Chinese context, it may be safe to say that bottom-up initiatives from universities
and university spin-offs are more likely to be taken by regional governments, which have no
administrative power over the universities. For instance, in the case of Tongji Creative
Cluster where the Tongji university’ and its spin-offs’ bottom up initiatives are integrated
into the district government’s economic development planning, the university is under the
joint jurisdiction of both the central government and the Shanghai Municipal Government.
Within such an administrative framework, it is actually impossible for the district
government to exercise much stronger control over the university or the university’s
engagement with the surrounding society. Therefore, the interaction and cooperation
between the university and local government are on equal basis (Cai and Liu 2014). Such
story also denotes that to best combine top-down and bottom-up initiatives, Chinese
universities must be more independent from the government.
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